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ABSTRACT. The term “social licence to operate” (SLO), popularized in corporate usage over the last 20 years, is frequently used to
refer to the level of social approval that exists in relation to the development of natural resources for private or public purposes. However,
the theoretical and practical utility of the concept remains contested and it is often used opportunistically to advance individual agendas.
Moreover, it remains difficult to assess how an adequate level of SLO can be transparently assessed, or how dialogue can be appropriately
achieved. In this paper we argue that the increasing use of the SLO concept is an indication that trust in, and the legitimacy of, formal
regulatory processes for natural resource management has eroded and needs to be reimagined. In response, we outline five principles
that provide pathways to increase the legitimacy of, and trust in, regulatory approval processes: (i) clear regulatory objectives; (ii)
transparent regulatory approval processes; (iii) clear pathways for appeals and reviews of regulatory decisions (iv) early and inclusive
collaborative consultation process; and (v) independence of decision-making authorities. By rethinking the basic principles of regulatory
and licencing processes in natural resource management, our five principles aim to reduce the need for SLO. This could minimize erratic
decision making and inequitable approval processes that are driven by a perceived need for SLO, often only for the corporate sector,
which risks the voices of other stakeholders being unevenly represented. We draw upon natural resource management experiences from
Tasmania, Australia as illustrative examples to stimulate a discussion on the usefulness of SLO and the need for improved approaches
to natural resource management.
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INTRODUCTION
Natural resources provide many benefits to society, but societal
acceptance of natural resource use by the private sector may be
affected if  it imposes a negative effect on society. There are critical
thresholds beyond which the level of societal benefits obtained
from natural resources is diminished (Lubchenco et al. 1991) and
the quality of the resource itself  is affected. As a result, we have
seen the rapid emergence of the term “social licence to operate”
(SLO) in the private sector, used to describe the level of social
approval that exists in relation to the development or use of
common pool resources for private or public purposes (Moffat et
al. 2016). Specifically, SLO refers to the initial approval and
ongoing acceptance of resource extraction or industrial activity
by local communities and other stakeholders affected by such
activities (Parsons and Moffat 2014). The degree to which this
acceptance is granted is rooted within the beliefs and worldviews
of these local communities and stakeholders and underpinned by
the extent to which an industry can establish meaningful and
trusted partnerships with local communities.  
Despite the recent and widespread adoption of SLO in relation
to the management of common pool resources, the theoretical
and practical utility of the concept remains contested (Parsons
and Moffat 2014, Moffat et al. 2016). For example, given the
numerous ways in which SLO has been applied across different
sectors, settings, and geographies, it has proven difficult to define
and in some cases, has been manipulated and used
opportunistically to advance private agendas (Bice and Moffat
2014, Lester 2016). Even when a collective or consensual
understanding of the term is established among diverse
stakeholder groups, assessment of how these levels of social
approval or acceptance might be transparently determined and
agreed upon can be challenging (Prno 2013, Parsons and Moffat
2014), undermining the perceived legitimacy of the action, e.g.,
industrial development.  
Despite the shortcomings of our collective understanding of SLO,
increased media attention on industry activities (e.g., Leith et al.
2014), coupled with growing societal pressure and expectations
on industry (Hanna et al. 2016), force the private sector to work
actively to obtain and maintain SLO. Given the potential
shortcomings of SLO, however, we contend that although
operators and regulators both have a part to play in building
public trust, public engagement and confidence in the activities
that impact the sustainability of common pool natural resources
should be primarily (and most easily) established through formal
environmental regulatory and assessment processes. There is no
obvious evidence that formal processes and requirement by the
regulator would crowd out any voluntary action by the private
sector to gain social acceptability (Hult 2018). However, public
trust and legitimacy in environmental regulation has eroded over
time and needs to be reimagined to better fulfil this purpose (Stern
and Baird 2015).  
We explore the proposition that growing pressure to obtain SLO
has developed in response to the erosion of public trust in
government structures and processes, and the legitimacy of
environmental regulation. Drawing upon the existing literature
on environmental governance we identify five principles that can
be applied to reform regulatory processes, which we believe will
increase public trust and legitimacy in environmental regulation.
We anticipate that adopting these five principles should effectively
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reduce the need for SLO and allay undue reliance on unclear
requirements associated with it. At the same time it should also
strengthen the commitment to sustainability principles and
process rigour that can ensure positive outcomes for society and
the environment. In our exploration we develop inductive theory
using the principles of good governance (Lockwood et al. 2010,
McCall and Dunn 2012, Cullen-Knox et al. 2017) and use natural
resource management experiences in Tasmania, Australia as
illustrative examples to stimulate a discussion on the usefulness
of SLO and the need for improved approaches to natural resource
management.
OVERVIEW OF SLO
Modern communities have increased expectations about their role
in decision making in resource development projects and how the
benefits of resource development will be distributed and shared
(Prno 2013). The resource sector has recognized this and
attempted to respond in order to meet societal expectations
around industry performance (mostly of an environmental and/
or social nature) leading to the wide adoption of the concept of
SLO.  
Originally, the concept of SLO emerged in response to
environmental conflicts between resource extraction industries
and communities (Thomson and Boutilier 2011) and over the last
20 years, the term has been popularized by the mining industry
as a response to managing their social and reputational risk. The
term is also progressively being applied and adopted across a
range of other natural resource industries to describe the changing
nature of the interactions among private companies and local
communities (Hall et al. 2015, Moffat et al. 2016, Kendal and
Ford 2018). Although social licence suggests a role in
environmental regulation, there is actually no legal process for
attaining it (Bursey and Whiting 2015). Rather, SLO is an informal
contract between industry (or others) and communities that is
awarded and maintained on the basis of transparent, ethical, and
responsible use of natural resources, as perceived by community
groups (Boutilier et al. 2012).  
Since entering the mainstream discourse in the 1990s (Boutilier
2014), SLO has been broadly used to describe the initial approval
and ongoing acceptance of industry activities by local
communities and the stakeholders who can influence the viability
of those activities (Parsons and Moffat 2014). Acceptance is
underpinned by the extent to which an industry can establish
meaningful partnerships with local communities that are built on
mutual norms, trust, and communication (Moffat and Zhang
2014, Hall et al. 2015). Where there is a lack of societal support
or outright opposition to natural resource development activities
this is expressed as a lack of SLO. SLO does not have legal
standing, but public opposition can strongly influence the success
of industry activities, and industries now recognize the need to
obtain SLO to avoid potentially costly conflict with community
groups (Prno 2013).  
Exploring the SLO literature, the three most widely referenced
conceptual models of SLO are the following: (1) the pyramid
model (Boutilier and Thomson 2011, unpublished manuscript,
 https://socialicense.com/publications/Modelling%20and%20Measuring%
20the%20SLO.pdf), (2) the three strand model (Morrison 2014),
and (3) the triangle model (Wüstenhagen et al. 2007). Each model
stems from different origins and illustrates different aspects of
the concept (see Appendix 1), but all are underpinned by the
common concepts of trust and legitimacy (Colton et al. 2016).
The pyramid model suggests there are four different stages in
attaining SLO: withdrawal, acceptance, approval, psychological
identification (Boutilier and Thomson 2011, unpublished
manuscript). The three strand model relates SLO to legal, political,
and economic licence and outlines the types of actors in each
licence domain (Morrison 2014). The triangle model provides
detail on the types of acceptance required for SLO, including
socio-political, community, and market acceptance (Wüstenhagen
et al. 2007).  
In all three models the importance of legitimacy and trust are
considered critical to achieving socially acceptable and
sustainable natural resource development and management
outcomes. Legitimacy can be defined as the perceived fairness and
procedural justice associated with processes and their outcomes.
This definition combines an empirical measure of legitimacy
(acceptance of a rule or institution as authoritative) and a
normative argument concerning whether the authority possesses
legitimacy (providing reasons that justify it; Bernstein 2005). Trust
means that an entity has confidence that the behavior of some
other entity will match their expectations (Cook 2001). Trust in
regulatory processes is centered on believing in the reliability,
truth, or ability of the regulatory agency (Pirson and Malhotra
2011) and the people that construct it, and is a core issue that
deeply influences the level of faith in a regulatory process.  
The relationship between trust and legitimacy is not
straightforward. For instance, there may be lack of legitimacy
even when trust is present. Further, conflict frequently arises
where legitimacy and/or trust have been eroded (Stern and Baird
2015). This erosion in trust and legitimacy can run in parallel to
an increase in societal pressure for natural resource developments
to obtain SLO. If  legitimacy and trust are strengthened through
more formal, transparent, clear, and predictable processes, this
can enhance their development between all relevant stakeholders.
Navigating trust has become increasingly complex, however, as
human interactions expand over multiple spatial, demographic,
and information scales, and this has raised the related question
on the legitimacy of activities. Trust dynamics in regulatory
relationships are under-researched, and surprisingly little
empirical research on trust has been conducted in the context of
regulator-regulated or citizen-regulator relationships (Lange and
Gouldson 2010).  
Conceptually, when exploring the context of SLO, trust and
legitimacy exist or are constructed between (1) the project
proponent, (2) local community and other outside stakeholders,
i.e., NGOs, (3) the regulatory body, i.e., decision makers and
experts who will or will not authorize industry projects and
activities, and (4) other project beneficiaries, including the
consumers (Fig. 1).  
As with any human relationship, SLO is a loosely defined concept
and difficulties around the use of the concept, and associated
concepts such as social “communities” and social accountability,
are well documented (Shepheard and Martin 2008, Moffat et al.
2016). SLO is perceived to be about justice, i.e., responsibility,
impact, standing, and interest, and it is embedded within an
“inescapably discursive” process (Lester 2016). Further, it is
decidedly unclear how meaningful dialogue, which SLO is
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Fig. 1. Conceptual representation of the trust and legitimacy relationships of different groups of actors
(indicated in the white boxes) in the context of a natural resource development project. The top section
represents the current situation and the bottom section represents the situation to build toward in which the
need for social licence is replaced. In both the top and bottom sections the light grey arrows represent the
legitimacy and trust relationships that currently underpin social licence. In the bottom section of the figure, the
dashed arrows indicate the trust and legitimacy relationships that should be strengthened to reduce the need for
social licence and the solid arrow represents the trust and legitimacy relationships that need to be built through a
better regulatory process.
purportedly founded upon, is conducted and achieved (Mercer-
Mapstone et al. 2017). There is large consensus that the meaning
of SLO is unclear, amorphous, and at times, confusing, it is “...
not easy to find, difficult to measure, and capricious and dynamic
in nature” (Douglas 2014:1). This has led some authors to suggest
that regulators, policy makers, and politicians should refrain from
using the term without a clear understanding of the implications
(Colton et al. 2016). Arguably, defining SLO can be a futile
enterprise: “We can’t neatly define social license, but we know it
when we see it” (U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stewart 1964, as cited
in Douglas 2014:1)  
We leave the discussion of the usefulness of the general concept
of SLO to others. Rather, we highlight that current societal
pressure on industry to secure a vaguely defined SLO, which
demonstrates perceived legitimacy and acceptability of their
activities, i.e., mining, fishing operations, windfarm developments,
etc., might better be achieved through reformed, effective, and
explicit regulatory pathways and processes. We draw on the
principles of good governance (Lockwood et al. 2010, McCall
and Dunn 2012, Cullen-Knox et al. 2017) to outline a way forward
that will reduce the need for SLO.
WAYS FORWARD WITHOUT SLO
As we have shown, SLO is heavily influenced by trust and
legitimacy, and vulnerable to complexities introduced by scale
issues and information and power asymmetries. Moreover, SLO
is contingent on personal and societal values and norms (Dare et
al. 2014). Values are notions of what is right and important, and
norms refer to behavioral expectations and how people should
and should not behave (Stern 2000). Examples from the literature
show that as the scale of interactions grow, tensions between
stakeholders increase and engender changes in institutions and
regulatory frameworks (Smidt 2003, Venticinque 2013,
Christensen and Kyle 2014). Increased complexities exposed
through expanding scales and growing societal asymmetries
necessitate that fundamental regulatory processes be reimagined.
We address this need in our description of five principles to
improve the regulatory process below (Fig. 2).
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Table 1. Good governance principles as listed in selected peer reviewed papers and reports (principles listed in no particular order and
original wording has been maintained as far as practical).
 
Governance
principles for
multilevel natural
resource
management
Principles of
relationships and
processes between
governing and
governed
Principles of
governance
(forestry)
Good governance
practice
Principles that
support good
governance
Principles of
Australian decision
making
Context of donor
organizations (i.e.,
NGOs)
(Lockwood et al.
2010)
(McCall and Dunn
2012)
(FAO 2011) (Smith and
Jentoft 2017)
(OECD 2013) (Cullen-Knox et al.
2017)
(van Doeveren 2011)
Legitimacy Legitimacy Transparency Transparent Engagement Incorporate
differing views
Openness and
transparency
Transparency Respect Fairness and
equity
Inclusive Accountability and
transparency
Adaptive Participation
Fairness Equity Participation Open Performance
evaluation
Flexible Accountability
Inclusiveness Accountability Accountability Independent
regulators
Reliable and useful
knowledge
Efficiency and
effectiveness
Accountability Competence Effectiveness Maintenance of
trust
Rule of law
Adaptability Efficiency Prevention of
undue influence
Capability Funding
Integration Role clarity
Fig. 2. Conceptual model of the five solutions (and interactions
between them) offered through reimagining the regulatory
processes and how they will affect social licence (in the black
box) by way of positive drivers of change (trust and
legitimacy). Also shown are the external factors that influence
trust and legitimacy.
Five principles for improving regulatory processes
The five principles we present here center on fundamental
premises that are demonstrated to be key to good governance in
environmental regulatory processes. Research articles that focus
on good governance do not all identify five premises or principles.
Rather, we have drawn from the extant literature to identify the
five overarching principles presented in Table 1.  
The principles shown in Table 1 are not an exhaustive list and
there are many more documents that outline good governance
principles. For example in Australia, a report by the Department
of Agriculture and Forestry outlines 10 leading governance
practices for development proposals and development
assessments (Development Assessment Forum 2005). The
literature shown in Table 1 was selected mainly because of its
relevance to natural resource management.
Tasmania as a case study
We outline the five principles that we believe could be applied to
reform regulatory processes to reduce the need for SLO, and
illustrate their importance using experiences in Tasmania,
Australia, as a case study. In doing so we acknowledge that the
regulatory requirements and mechanisms for natural resource
developments are not uniform across industry or jurisdiction
(even within Australia).  
There are four reasons that Tasmania was chosen as a case study:
it is a relatively small island, i.e., geographically bounded, and
thus, at a scale arguably more manageable for study; it has a well-
known environmental history with one of the most significant
environmental campaigns in Australian history occurring in
reaction to the Gordon-below-Franklin dam (Bandler 1987); it is
an Australian State, i.e., jurisdictionally bounded; and it has an
integrated and well-functioning planning system. Tasmania is
also known for its pristine environments, and as the birthplace of
a national environmental movement (Hay 1994), and there have
been major reforms to environmental policy in Tasmania over the
past decades (Stratford 2008).  
The island of Tasmania is also an Australian State, which bounds
the legislation relevant to our premise. Constitutional authority
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for planning in Australia rests with the states (Ruming and Gurran
2014) and is not coordinated by the national government.
Tasmania has an independent review tribunal and there is
institutional separation of the environmental assessment and
enforcement functions from the environmental policy functions
(Development Assessment Forum 2005, Productivity Commission
2013). Tasmania also has a leading practice, in that it specifies a
consistent schedule of objects across its legislation and a set of
objectives is included in a schedule to each of the acts within the
Resource Management and Planning System, to ensure that all
decisions about the use of land and natural resources within the
state are made in pursuit of common objectives (Land Use and
Planning Approvals Act 1993, schedule 1).  
In broad terms, assessment arrangements in Tasmania can be
characterized as relatively integrated. Of all the Australian states,
independent major project assessment arrangements are perhaps
most developed in Tasmania, where the Tasmanian Planning
Commission (an independent statutory body under the
Tasmanian Planning Commission Act 1997) is responsible for
conducting an integrated assessment of projects of state
significance. The commission then makes recommendations to
the minister. Reforms that have taken place with respect to the
planning system in the unique economic and environmental
context of Tasmania have been studied by, for instance, Castles
and Stradford (2014).
Clear regulatory objectives
Place-based regulatory objectives for use of natural resources
(that are sensitive to higher level ecological limits) set the
boundary conditions for the natural resource use development.
This may also be considered as setting the limits of acceptable
change. Resource use objectives should be clearly articulated and
defined before a development project is even raised and they
should not be determined internally within government processes.
Pathways for appeal and review can assure stakeholders that
avenues are available to ensure that these boundary conditions
are actually met.  
Objectives should be agreed upon by fair processes, which
fundamentally require collaborative consultation (Dichmont et
al. 2016, Dutra et al. 2016, Van Putten et al. 2016). For instance,
high-level, spatially explicit objectives for marine areas in
Australia are particularly important to manage increasingly
crowded inshore spaces. The issue of unclear objectives for an
inshore area developed into an SLO issue in Ralphs Bay, Tasmania
in 2004 (MacDonald and Feehely 2010). A canal development
was proposed for Ralphs Bay (Stratford 2009) and it soon became
apparent that the public, government, and developers had vastly
different and conflicting objectives for the area, including
conservation, residential areas, and tourism. Objectives had not
been clearly (or collaboratively) defined prior to the development
proposal submission. The proponents were eventually denied the
right to proceed with the canal development after consideration
by an independent statutory body of the planning arm of the
Tasmanian Government (Stratford 2009).  
The importance of using collaborative consultation to develop
and prioritize clear objectives is expected to contribute to
increased transparency and trust. For example, in a fisheries
context, when use-rights are assigned, i.e., allocation of individual
tradeable quota under a total allowable catch system, the
objectives associated with the introduction of new management,
e.g., a profitable industry and sustainable environment, must be
carefully defined. Principally, because future use is likely to have
negative impact on those for whom access will be denied (Buxton
and Cochrane 2016, Emery et al. 2016). In the mid-1980s in
Tasmania, a consultative process, which as not strictly a
collaborative consultation process as we defined it, was used in
the rock lobster and abalone fisheries to introduce management
change. The interactions that this process facilitated likely
contributed to greater clarity around the objectives for changing
the management approach, even if  not all the proponents agreed
on the approach used to meet these objectives (Bradshaw 2004).
Collaborative processes in the development of a new management
system provided an opportunity to assess the diversity of views,
while also working toward a sustainable natural resource
management solution.
Transparent regulatory approval processes
The importance of transparency in the regulatory approval
process would seem self-evident, particularly following the
impacts of the global economic and financial crisis that
highlighted major flaws in governance and regulations systems
that undermined public trust in both government and private
sector institutions. According to the OECD (2012), the principles
of transparency and participation in regulatory processes support
outcomes that serve the public interest and that are legitimately
informed by the interests and needs of those affected by such
regulation. When approvals for developments are submitted to
governing agencies, the steps and requirements of potential
approvals need to be outlined clearly so that stakeholders with an
interest in the development can independently assess whether
appropriate and just procedures are being followed. Looking
again at our Tasmanian example, an approval process associated
with a pulp mill proposal in the north of the island in 2013 evolved
into a SLO debacle (Lester 2016). Instead of revealing the project
approval process to the public and other proponents, the project
was removed from the independent assessment process of the
Resource Planning and Development Commission (RPDC), and
assessment and project-specific, i.e., less transparent, legislation
was politically approved without any public input (http://www.
parliament.tas.gov.au/bills/Bills2014/1_of_2014.htm). Subsequent
assessment by the government provoked suspicion around the
process and it was perceived to be opaque to scrutiny, as well as
politically biased (Lester 2016). Dubious alliances between the
government and proponents further deepened this SLO
controversy. The process eventually led to Gunns Limited
deciding not to proceed with a pulp mill development in the area
(Gale 2008, Lester 2016).
Clear pathways for appeal and review
Clearly articulated resource-use objectives are important, but
clarity in the pathways available for appeal and review before and
during development projects are also key to trust and legitimacy,
especially where the regulator is seen to be rigorously enforcing
the law on behalf  of the public. A cooperative (or compliance-
based) regulatory style is more likely to be based on higher levels
of three-way trust and collaboration, i.e., between regulators,
project proponents, and the community (Lange and Gouldson
2010) than an adversarial or sanctions-based regulatory style
(Stern 2008).  
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“To ensure predictability of process there should be a clear
procedure for all steps of the grievance handling and dispute
resolution process” (Kemp and Gotzmann 2009:18). Clearly
defined pathways for appeal that are not perceived as (too)
restrictive, but nevertheless based on objective, i.e., collaboratively
defined, criteria, will ensure that some of the most difficult to
control aspects of SLO are addressed (Kemp and Gotzmann
2009), e.g., provide a chance for the voices of all stakeholders to
be heard. These principles align with 2008 United Nations
Directive Clause 82, page 22(UN Human Rights Council 2008).  
In Tasmania, there are essentially three pathways for review in
assessment and approval processes (Productivity Commission
2013): (1) merit review (the Appeal Tribunal on a local council
planning decision); (2) judicial review (to the Supreme Court on
a matter of process not merit); and (3) Parliamentary review (in
the case of Projects of State Significance, there is an opportunity
to disallow an approval that is different to that recommended by
the independent commission). These linked but independent
processes are clearly defined and cater for different types of review
needs and access.  
Where previously clearly outlined approval processes are
opportunistically changed, this may affect trust and legitimacy.
For instance, the approval process for the Gunns Limited pulp
mill development (Gale 2008, Lester 2016) discussed above was
removed from an independent assessment to project-specific
legislation. This legislation did not provide a clear avenue for
review and appeals affecting the company’s SLO and the
perception of hidden processes and lack of transparency likely
further degraded public trust and SLO (Lester 2016).
Early and inclusive collaborative consultation process
Both clarity and transparency are mediated by implementing an
inclusive collaborative consultation process (Idol et al. 1995).[1] 
Simple participation might not be sufficient to create trust,
whereas collaborative consultation can help to create and
sometimes reinforce trust (Kemp and Gotzmann 2009, Miller and
Nadeau 2017). There are many ways to implement public
participation and deliberation to rebuild trust and positively
influence the ecological standard of decisions; for example, by
using face-to-face communication (Newig and Fritsch 2009) and
the involvement of professionals (Tsang et al. 2009). Stakeholder
involvement in the collaborative consultation process should
commence early, i.e., in the scoping phase of project proposals
and impact assessments. For instance, impact assessments are part
of the development application process in many jurisdictions.
These impact assessments may be seen by companies as double-
bind because they expose risks, but the exposure of risks in itself
could give the impression of transparency and potentially build
trust (see Renn and Schweizer 2009 for concept of inclusive risk
governance). Even in situations where trust has been lost, or
meagre trust exists, an open dialogue can build a shared
understanding of the various interests and facilitate compromise
(Díez et al. 2015) building longer-term trust (Gouldson et al.
2007).  
The SLO issue that arose in reaction to the Abel Tasman super
trawler in Tasmania and adjacent waters (Haward et al. 2013,
Tracey et al. 2013, Wainwright 2015) in 2012 may have been
avoided had a collaborative consultation process been
implemented earlier. The super trawler was banned from
operating by the federal authority even though all biological and
operating requirements were met in the formal approval processes
(Haward et al. 2013). The current decision making and approval
process in Tasmania (and Australian federal fisheries) includes
stakeholder participation in impact assessment, but stakeholders
who are not directly involved may be ignorant of the current
consultation process. Consultation of the broader group of
stakeholders, earlier in the approval process might be required to
gain the trust of resource users as well as the regulators, who in
this case, revoked their approval of the super trawler, increasing
suspicion and reducing public trust in the approval process
(Buxton et al. 2013).  
Given the range and diversity of values held by the public, the
question remains as to who should participate in the collaborative
consultation process (Alberts 2007) and be engaged in setting
resource management objectives to achieve a clearer theoretical,
as well as more transparent, regulatory and approval process
(Productivity Commission 2013). Fundamentally, the means by
which different groups of people are selected to be included in the
official process must be a fair and accountable (Parsons et al.
2014). Collaborative consultation should be accessible and
adequate and provide people from different backgrounds “an
opportunity to participate in a meaningful way” (Colton et al.
2016:105).  
A wind farm proposal in King Island in 2012, off  the north coast
of Tasmania, did not proceed allegedly because of low-projected
financial returns but purportedly, SLO issues that arose also
played a role (Corscadden et al. 2012, Anderson 2013, Colvin et
al. 2016). In this case, the deliberation processes were implemented
early when the proposal was first muted, but because of the
apparent haphazard nature of consultation and information
dispersal (and the proponent itself  setting an arbitrary measure
of SLO at 60% of public approval) the proponents were met with
an SLO issue from components of the community that
contributed to community conflict. Had the process been more
accessible and had stronger formal processes for deliberation been
available, it is likely that the outcomes could have been different
in terms of earning SLO for this wind farm development.
Independence in decision making
The regulatory approval process is complex and working to
accommodate social acceptance is a challenging process.
“Perceptions of independence and hence an absence of
inappropriately shared interests are key to whether citizens trust
regulators or scientists” (Lange and Gouldson 2010:5237).
Regulatory proceedings typically involve lengthy submissions by
various stakeholders and interveners, and often by various
governmental entities. Where evidence is given and tested under
oath, this may contribute to the credibility of the process and may
bolster public acceptability. However, most independent
assessments are not courts that require the provision of evidence
under oath. In fact, it can be argued that though courts or
tribunals provide independence, the more formal and legalistic
they are, the less accessible they become to the public. They are
thus likely to favor the wealthy, well-educated, and well-resourced
who have the capacity to engage in these sessions, and employ
lawyers, etc.  
Although acknowledging that adversarial procedures are costly
in terms of time and resources, we still argue that they can serve
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an important purpose, within which interrogatory processes and
cross-examination are important tools. However, such cross-
examination, and indeed the entire regulatory proceeding, must
also reflect the anticipated magnitude of impacts of the ultimate
decision (Colton et al. 2016). The Ralphs Bay project
(MacDonald and Feehely 2010) was denied and the final decision
accepted by proponents because the arbitrators were seen as being
at arm’s length from the government. The independent and court-
like proceedings purportedly assured local people and provided
a feeling of transparency. The proposed canal development in
Ralphs Bay was eventually overturned by the Tasmanian Planning
Commission (MacDonald and Feehely 2010, Tasmanian
Planning Commission 2010). The independent decision process
seems to have been successful in creating acceptance and
purportedly created trust in the process, which can be of future
benefit to similar situations.
CONCLUSION
Natural resources are undeniably and increasingly complicated
to share, contain, and manage, and necessitate various complex
management strategies and procedures. Reliance on SLO presents
a danger of introducing an undefined concept, prone to different
interpretations, into a natural resource development approval
process that requires clarity and transparency. Rather than
requiring a shift in the way governments function, the focus of
SLO to date has been narrowly on industry with the exclusion of
government, with no clear guidelines for how industry might be
adapting in line with these societal responses.  
We contend that the need for a public statement of SLO as a
prerequisite to development approval can be reduced if  the key
elements of SLO, i.e., trust and legitimacy, can be systematically
enhanced through regulatory and assessment processes. A more
formalized path toward creating trust and legitimacy can ensure
that the process of gaining an SLO need not be reinvented every
time a development application is put forward. If  there is
legitimacy and trust in institutions (thus, indirectly in the
regulatory and licencing process), we argue that there is no reason
to believe formal processes and requirements would crowd out
any additional voluntary action by industry (Grepperud 2007);
private responsibility for good governance should be maintained.
SLO can be explored when these formal processes and
requirements no longer protect or represent community interests
and expectations.  
We explicate five principles of good governance that have been
distilled from the extant literature on environmental governance,
and highlight experiential evidence from Tasmanian to justify our
argument that these five principles present clear pathways to
reform regulatory processes. Reform has great potential to
increase public trust and legitimacy in environmental regulation.
To recapitulate, our five key principles comprise the following: (i)
clear regulatory objectives; (ii) transparent regulatory approval
processes; (iii) clear pathways for appeals and reviews of
regulatory decisions; (iv) early and inclusive collaborative
consultation process (Ostrom 2009, Productivity Commission
2013); and (v) independence of decision-making authorities. We
argue that adopting these principles will contribute to increasing
trust and legitimacy by influencing positive drivers of change,
increasing social capital, and reducing reliance on SLO that
requires reinterpretation with every new development proposal.
Implementing these key principles must go hand in hand with
ongoing research that is developing locally appropriate natural
resource governance structures, to ensure that the best
environmental and socially equitable outcomes can be achieved.  
__________  
[1] Collaborative consultation is defined as an “interactive process
that enables people with diverse expertise to generate creative
solutions to mutually defined problems” (Idol et al. 1995:329).
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/10397
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Appendix 1. Diagram combining the three most widely referenced conceptual models of social licence 
to operate (SLO) and outlining the relationship between them. The triangle model is indicated in the 
light grey triangles on the left-hand side of the diagram showing the types of acceptance for SLO by 
group. The three strand model is shown by the circles which relates SLO to the different types of 
licences. The pyramid model on the right-hand side of the diagram shows the different stages of SLO 
and that the highest level of social licence is attained when there is psychological identification. 
Conceptualized relationships between the models are indicated by the arrows. The black circle in the 
center depicts the resource use for which SLO applies. 
 
 
